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Abstract 
A possible Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement will further 
integrate agricultural markets between the United States and the European Union. The 
elimination of tariffs and cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary measures will promote cross-
Atlantic trade. We empirically estimate the impacts of tariffs and Maximum Residue Limits 
(MRLs) on trade in plant products between the two partners. Furthermore, we simulate trade 
expansions under plausible negotiation outcomes. We find that a TTIP agreement promotes 
cross-Atlantic trade in plant products, in both directions, by over 60% if tariffs are removed and 
MRLs are mutually recognized or harmonized to Codex levels. 
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1. Introduction  
The first round of the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations was launched in July, 2013, with the aim to improve market access, regulatory 
coherence, and modes of cooperation between the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU) (European Commission, 2015a). Although the TTIP negotiations are ongoing, official press 
releases suggest that the removal of tariffs and the minimization of the impacts of sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures are top priorities. For example, an EU position paper outlines that 
one of EU’s goals is to “remove nearly all customs duties on EU-US trade” (European 
Commission, 2015b). In addition, both sides strive for a SPS chapter in the potential TTIP 
agreement that “builds upon the key principles of the SPS Agreement of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)” (European Commission, 2013).  
Average customs duties are generally low between the US and the EU. Nevertheless, 
tariffs are higher for agricultural products than for manufactured goods (Josling and Tangermann, 
2015). Non-tariff measures including the SPS measures tend to be more stringent in the EU than 
in the US. For instance, the EU enforces tougher food safety standards for aflatoxin residues in 
food items (Xiong and Beghin, 2012), pesticide residues in food products (Li and Beghin, 2014), 
and growth additives in livestock industries such as hormones and ractopamine (Bureau, Marette, 
and Schiavina, 1998; Alemanno and Capodieci, 2012). In addition, the EU adopts stricter 
regulations on emerging biotechnologies such as genetically modified crops (Moschini, 2008). 
Several studies in the literature have assessed the economic impacts of a forthcoming 
TTIP agreement, with emphasis on different products and policy reforms. In a report for the 
European Parliament, Bureau et al. (2014) project that the removal of tariffs and the 25% 
reduction in non-tariff measures will raise EU agri-food export to the US by 60% and import 
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from the US by 120%. Beghin, Bureau, and Gohin (2014) find that the removal of tariffs and 
tariff-rate quotas in the biofuel and feedstock markets will boost the ethanol and biodiesel sector 
in the US and the sugar and isoglucose sector in the EU. Using a computational general 
equilibrium model, Cororaton and Orden (2016) report modest gains in agricultural exports in 
both economies if the TTIP agreement does not substantially reduce non-tariff barriers. In an 
econometric analysis, Arita, Mitchell, and Beckman (2015) find that non-tariff measures are 
highly restrictive for agri-food exporters from both the US and the EU. Akgul, Hertel, and 
Villoria (2016) examine the possible removal of an EU ban on hormone-treated beef within a 
GTAP model accounting for productivity difference among beef processors. They find that beef 
trade across the Atlantic would increase by over $400 million a year. 
In this article, we focus on two sets of policy reforms that can result from a potential 
TTIP agreement: the elimination of tariffs, and the cooperation on Maximum Residue Limits 
(MRLs) that govern pesticide residue concentrations in plant products. First, we deploy an 
econometric model to estimate the impacts of tariffs and MRLs on the bilateral trade in plant 
products between the two trade partners. Second, we simulate the economic gains to US and EU 
exporters under two plausible TTIP negotiation outcomes: (1) the removal of tariffs and the 
mutual recognition of MRLs; (2) the removal of tariffs and the compliance to Codex MRLs as 
recommended by the WTO. 
We find that the tariffs significantly constrain cross-Atlantic trade in plant products. 
Moreover, we find that the MRLs in both markets raise costs borne by foreign suppliers on the 
one hand and sustain import demand on the other. The simulation results suggest that the 
elimination of tariffs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by 49%, or $300 million a 
year, and US export of plant products to the EU by 38%, or $940 million a year. Finally, the 
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mutual recognition of cross-Atlantic MRLs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by 
13%, or $79 million a year, and US export of plant products to the EU by 25%, or $635 million a 
year. The alignment of each country’s MRLs on Codex MRLs expands across-Atlantic trade 
even more. Overall, the gain in export revenue is over 60% for both the US and the EU. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current 
markets and policy instruments pertaining to plant products in the US and the EU. Section 3 uses 
an econometric model to quantify the impact of tariffs and MRLs on the bilateral trade between 
US, EU, and other trading partners. Section 4 describes data sources and presents estimation 
results. Section 5 projects the economic gains from a potential TTIP agreement under different 
policy scenarios. Section 6 concludes the article and suggests directions for future research. 
2. An overview of trade in plant products and regulatory regimes across the Atlantic 
Cross-Atlantic trade in plant products is worth more than $3 billion.3 In 2012, US import value 
of plant products from the EU was $620 million, while US export of plant products to the EU 
totaled $2.5 billion. The customs duties are generally low in either market. Specifically, the 
simple average tariff for plant products is about 4% in the US and 10% in the EU. However, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures diverge significantly across the Atlantic (Bureau et al., 2014; 
Josling and Tangermann, 2015).  
In particular, the regulatory regime governing pesticide residues differs substantially 
between the two markets. The primary policy instrument is the Maximum Residue Limit, which 
sets the maximum permissible rate of concentration for a specific chemical residue in a specific 
product. The Codex Alimentarius, a body under the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization and the World Health Organization, develops international MRLs based on science. 
However, the Codex standards are voluntary in nature, as the WTO acknowledges member 
                                                          
3 Appendix A provides the coverage of products. 
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countries’ sovereign right in setting their own standards. Nevertheless, The SPS Agreement of 
the WTO encourages its members to use CODEX MRLs whenever they are available. 
Neither the US nor the EU is currently in compliance with the Codex standards. In 
particular, Li and Beghin (2014) find that the MRLs in the US do not exactly follow Codex 
recommendations, but on aggregate are pretty close to them. However, the MRLs implemented 
in the EU are considerably more restrictive than the Codex counterparts (see the data section 
below for summary values). 
3. An econometric analysis of the US-EU trade in plant products 
3.1. The econometric specification 
In this section, we provide an econometric model to characterize the cross-Atlantic trade in plant 
products. Specifically, we extend the model developed by Xiong and Beghin (2014) with 
emphasis on the US-EU partnership.  In the original model, Xiong and Beghin (2014) use the 
MRL stringency index of Li and Beghin (2014) to measure the restrictiveness of MRLs by 
product and by nation. In particular, the MRL stringency index is averaged across MRLs 
targeting all pesticides and chemicals applicable to a specific product. A higher MRL stringency 
index indicates a more restrictive MRL policy. If a country defers its MRLs to Codex, the 
stringency index takes the value of one.  
More importantly, the model in Xiong and Beghin (2014) accounts for the impacts of 
MRLs on both the supply side and the demand side of the market. They find empirical evidence 
that a more stringent MRL imposes extra costs on foreign suppliers on one hand, and stimulates 
additional demand via quality assurance or information disclosure on the other. With focus on 
the US-EU partnership, we extend the model by allowing MRLs in the EU and the US to have 
different impacts than the MRLs adopted by other developed nations. 
Page 7 of 21 
 
Specifically, the econometric model is as follows: 
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where sijtT  is the trade value of product s in year t from the exporting nation i to the importing 
nation j; the function I{} generates an indicator variable that equals one if the bilateral trade 
involves EU or US as the importer or the exporter and zero otherwise; and sijtar  is the ad 
valorem tariff rate imposed by country j on product s from country i. Note that the additional 
slopes assigned to the tariffs and MRLs implemented by the US and the EU allow us to focus on 
cross-Atlantic policies and outcomes. 
On the second line of the above equation, the variable max{ ,0}sjt sitMRL MRL−  captures 
the trade-cost effect of MRLs. That is, exporters overcome additional costs when selling to 
countries where the MRLs are more stringent than the counterparts at home. Note that the 
bilateral trade is not disrupted when the MRLs are harmonized between the trading partners.4 As 
for the tariff variable, we separately identify the trade-cost effects of MRLs when the EU or the 
US is involved as the exporter or the importer. 
The variable sjtMRL  on the third line of the equation can be interpreted as the demand-
enhancing effect of the MRL policy for product s in the importing country j. Specifically, a more 
restrictive MRL regime stimulates or sustains demand by ensuring quality or addressing 
asymmetric information in the agri-food markets (Thilmany and Barrett, 1997). On the last line 
of the regression equation, we control for the supply capacity of sector s in the exporting country 
                                                          
4 In the model, the mutual recognition of MRLs would have the same cost-reducing effect as harmonization, as the 
divergence in MRLs no longer hinders trade between trading partners. 
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i ( sitQ ), the distance between the two trading partners ( ijdist ), whether the two nations use the 
same official language ( ijLang ), whether the countries are adjacent ( ijBord ) or have a colonial 
tie in history ( ijCol ). Finally, we include time-varying importers’ fixed effects ( jtfe ) and time-
varying and chapter-specific exporters’ fixed effects ( hitfe ) to account for the multilateral trade 
resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).5 
3.2. Data features and the estimation procedure 
We utilize the data set in Xiong and Beghin (2014). Specifically, the data covers bilateral trade 
records of disaggregated plant products from 61 nations to 20 high-income nations in the years 
2007–2008 and 2011–2012.6 The effectively applied tariffs are retrieved from the MacMap 
database. The MRL data as of 2008 is sourced from the Homologa database provided by the 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the United Kingdom. The MRL data as 
of 2012 originates from the GlobalMRLs databank of Bryant Christie Inc. Other bilateral 
variables are retrieved from the CEPII database. The 2007 and 2008 trade series are matched 
with MRL stringency indices in 2008 by product and by nation. Similarly, the 2011 and 2012 
trade flows are aligned with the MRL stringency measurements as of 2012. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the MRL stringency indices in the importing 
markets. The MRLs enforced by the EU are highly restrictive. Specifically, the EU MRL index is 
1.53 in 2008 and 1.39 in 2012. Since the stringency index of Codex MRLs is one by default, the 
MRL regime in the EU is nearly 40% tougher than the international recommendations. The MRL 
stringency index in the US is slightly below one in both periods, suggesting that the regulatory 
regime in the US is almost equivalent to Codex levels. The MRL polices implemented by other 
                                                          
5 The chapters are defined at the HS-2 levels, whereas the plant products of interest are defined at either HS-4 or 
HS-6 levels. 
6 See Appendix A for the coverage of products and Appendix B for the coverage of nations. 
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importing markets are less restrictive than the EU but tougher than the US or Codex. Although 
the MRL information is frequently updated by regulatory bodies across the world, the overall 
stringency did not vary substantially from 2008 to 2012.  
Table 1. Summary statistics of the MRL stringency indices 
MRL stringency index: 2008  2012 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
      
EU 1.53 0.37  1.39 0.48 
US 0.94 0.40  0.97 0.33 
Other high-income OECD nations 1.12 0.48  1.29 0.50 
All importing nations 1.15 0.49  1.27 0.49 
Note: Appendix B provides the list of importing markets. Codex MRLs have a 
stringency index of one. 
 
  A prominent feature of bilateral trade records at disaggregated product levels is that zero 
trade flows are pervasive. In the dataset, more than 80% of the 315,397 observations correspond 
to the absence of trade. To account for the large portion of missing trade, we use the two-step 
Heckman procedure to estimate the regression equation. Following Xiong and Beghin (2014), we 
choose the common religion variable as the excluded variable to facilitate the identification of 
the Heckman procedure. Furthermore, to allow heterogeneity in the self-selection process across 
different agricultural sectors, we also include the interaction terms of the excluded variable and 
the fixed effects at the HS-2 chapter level. 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1. Estimation results and marginal effects 
We focus on the marginal effects of the tariffs and MRLs in this section, while leaving the 
estimated coefficients to Appendix C.7 Specifically, Table 2 shows the marginal effects of tariffs 
and MRLs along the intensive margin of trade. That is, the impacts on the trade volumes given 
                                                          
7 One can verify from Appendix C that the estimated coefficients of other trade costs bear the expected signs, except 
for the effect of common border on the probability of trade partnership. 
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that bilateral trade already takes place. We later define the marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs 
along the extensive margin. 
Table 2. Marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the intensive margin 
 US as exporter EU as exporter 3rd country exporter 
US as importer       
Tariff   -7.846*** (1.107) -7.476*** (1.090) 
MRL: demand enhancement n.a.  1.682*** (0.179)  1.543*** (0.159) 
MRL: trade cost   -1.274*** (0.261) -0.599** (0.235) 
       
EU as importer       
Tariff  -2.408*** (0.367)   -2.489*** (0.207) 
MRL: demand enhancement  0.379* (0.199) n.a.  0.697*** (0.066) 
MRL: trade cost  -0.670*** (0.208)   -0.347*** (0.073) 
       
3rd country importer       
Tariff -0.846** (0.338) -1.296*** (0.256) -0.926*** (0.138) 
MRL: demand enhancement -0.086 (0.215)  0.370*** (0.125)  0.232**  (0.105) 
MRL: trade cost 0.626*** (0.236)  0.275* (0.165)  0.950*** (0.128) 
Note: The marginal effects correspond to the estimated coefficients with correction for self-
selection to trade. Standard errors are in parentheses. The notations *, **, and *** represent the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 2, tariffs significantly impede agricultural trade cross the Atlantic. 
The tariff elasticity of US import from the EU is over -7, and the tariff elasticity of US export to 
the EU is -2.4. In an earlier study, Bureau et al. (2014) also find that the tariff elasticity of cross-
Atlantic agricultural trade is well above one. With US-EU trade flows excluded, the marginal 
effect of tariffs on trade volumes among third countries is nearly one.  
Next, we attend to the marginal effects of MRLs in Table 2. We find that the MRL 
policies in either the US or the EU exhibit dual effects. That is, the MRLs impose extra costs on 
foreign suppliers as well as sustain demand for imports via information disclosure or quality 
assurance. In particular, the MRLs in the US affect market participants more profoundly than the 
MRLs in the EU. The plausible reason is that the harmonization of MRLs among EU member 
states has reduced the disruptions of MRLs within the common market. In addition, we find that 
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the MRLs adopted by other high-income nations generally promote imports of plant products. 
However, the positive trade-cost effects of MRLs implemented by third nations are unexpected. 
One possible explanation is that these MRLs impose more costs onto domestic producers than 
foreign suppliers. As a result, a more stringent MRL regime further diminishes the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sectors.8 
As a complement to Table 2, Table 3 presents the marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs 
along the extensive margin of trade. That is, the impacts on the likelihood of trade partnership. 
The effects along the extensive margin are of particular interest when certain policies impose 
substantial costs on foreign suppliers and therefore drive vulnerable exporters out of the market 
altogether. The reduction or removal of these prohibitive measures expands the variety of 
products traded in the world market or the number of nations participating in international trade. 
Table 3. Marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the extensive margin 
 US as exporter EU as exporter 3rd country exporter 
US as importer       
Tariff   -4.527*** (0.555) -4.861*** (0.547) 
MRL: demand enhancement n.a.  1.069*** (0.102)  1.097*** (0.094) 
MRL: trade cost   -0.850*** (0.152) -0.569*** (0.138) 
       
EU as importer       
Tariff -1.541*** (0.235)   -1.852*** (0.112) 
MRL: demand enhancement -0.039 (0.127) n.a.  0.291*** (0.037) 
MRL: trade cost -0.157 (0.130)    0.025 (0.042) 
       
3rd country importer       
Tariff -0.237 (0.222) -0.214* (0.125) -0.548*** (0.079) 
MRL: demand enhancement -0.249* (0.141)  0.053 (0.072)  0.081  (0.062) 
MRL: trade cost  0.382** (0.147)  0.283*** (0.095)  0.564*** (0.075) 
Note: The marginal effects correspond to the changes in the log-likelihood of trade partnership in 
response to changes in the explanatory variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. The notations 
*, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 3, tariffs lower the likelihood of the occurrence of trade across the 
                                                          
8 See Marette and Beghin (2010) for a conceptual model capturing the impacts of standards on comparative 
advantages.  
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Atlantic. The result suggests that the elimination of tariffs will expand the variety of plant 
products traded between the US and the EU. Moreover, the increase in variety will be more 
substantial in the US market than in the EU market, probably because the diversity of EU 
imports is more constrained by non-tariff measures in the EU. We also find that the MRLs in the 
US affect the propensity of both US importers and EU exporters. In contrast, the MRLs in the 
EU do not affect EU-US partnership and even make EU’s sourcing from third countries more 
likely.9 As in Table 2, we find no evidence that the MRLs enforced by third nations suppress the 
probability of trade. 
In summary, the marginal effects in Table 2 and Table 3 provide a quantitative 
assessment of the impacts of tariffs and MRLs on the across-Atlantic trade in plant products. The 
overall effects of trade liberalization can be derived by combining the marginal effects along 
both margins of trade. In the next subsection, we simulate the potential gains to agricultural 
exporters in the US and the EU, under possible policy environments implied by a forthcoming 
TTIP agreement. 
4.2. Simulation results and policy implications 
The gradual removal of all import duties and the cooperation on non-tariff measures are 
high priorities in the ongoing TTIP negotiations. Although a duty-free market across the Atlantic 
is a preferred outcome by both sides, the risk perceptions and assessments of other public 
policies such as the SPS measures differ greatly between the US and the EU markets. We 
consider two plausible policy scenarios resulting from the TTIP negations. In the first scenario, 
tariffs are eliminated and the both markets consider the MRLs effective in the other market 
equivalent to the domestic standards (i.e., mutual recognition). In the second scenario implied by 
                                                          
9 The finding lends support to the idea that non-tariff measures addressing market imperfections can be trade 
catalysts rather than impediments. See the 2012 World Trade Report of the WTO for a survey of non-tariff measures 
and multilateral trade issues. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr12_e.htm 
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the TTIP agreement, cross-Atlantic tariffs are removed and both the US and the EU defer their 
MRLs to the Codex counterparts. Under this negotiation outcome, the TTIP agreement would be 
consistent with the SPS Agreement and Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement of the WTO. 
Table 4 shows the simulated trade expansions due to a TTIP agreement in both scenarios. 
Table 4. Expansions in across-Atlantic trade in plant products 
 TTIP outcome 1: 
mutual recognition 
TTIP outcome 2: 
Harmonization to Codex MRLs 
Gains to US exporters   
From tariff elimination 38% 38% 
From MRL changes 25% 26% 
   
Gains to EU exporters   
From tariff elimination 49% 49% 
From MRL changes 13% 21% 
Note: The trade expansions account for the increase in trade volumes (or the intensive margin) 
and the increase in trade likelihood (or the extensive margin). 
 
As shown in Table 4, the elimination of tariffs promotes US export to the EU by 38%, or 
$940 million a year based on the trade record as of 2012. Similarly, the tariff removal boosts US 
import from the EU by 49%, or $300 million a year. Note that the simulated trade expansions do 
not incorporate potential feedback effects from field crops to processed food items such as meat 
and dairy products along the supply chain. 
Next, we discuss the expansions of trade induced by cross-Atlantic cooperation on MRL 
policies. Under the first negotiation outcome, the US and the EU mutually recognize the MRLs 
adopted in the other market. The equivalence of MRLs exempts exporters from incurring 
additional costs in order to penetrate the other market. We expect that US exporters benefit more 
from mutual recognition than EU exporters because the current MRL regime is tougher in the 
EU than in the US (recall Table 1). At the same time, the mutual recognition might lead EU 
consumers to perceive US imports as inferior. Such changes of risk or quality perceptions in the 
EU are likely to weaken the demand for US imports.  As shown in Table 4, the mutual 
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recognition of MRLs raises US export to the EU by 25%, or $635 million a year, and US import 
from the EU by 13%, or $79 million a year. 
Under the second TTIP negotiation outcome, both the US and the EU endorse the Codex 
MRLs. This implies a substantial relaxation of MRLs in the EU and a slight strengthening of 
MRLs in the US (recall Table 1). The adherence to a common set of MRLs spares exporters from 
overcoming extra hurdles when selling across the Atlantic. As in the case of mutual recognition, 
we expect US exporters to gain more than EU exporters because a more stringent regulatory 
regime is currently effective in the EU. In addition, the relaxation of MRLs in the EU suppresses 
EU demand, as European consumers adjust their risk and quality perceptions. Similarly, the 
strengthening of MRLs in the US is likely to enhance the demand for plant products in the US. 
According to Table 4, US export to the EU increases by 26%, slightly higher than in the case of 
mutual recognition.  The reason is that European consumers perceive US imports as less inferior 
when the US strengths its MRLs to meet Codex recommendations. Finally, we find that US 
import from the EU rises by 21%, higher than13% under mutual recognition. The reason is that 
the US compliance with Codex enhances US demand for plant products. Overall, the cross-
Atlantic trade in plant products expands by more than 60%, in either direction, in response to a 
comprehensive TTIP agreement that addresses both tariffs and non-tariff measures.10 
5. Conclusions 
The ongoing TTIP negotiations between the US and the EU are expected to bring forth a broad-
based trade agreement that further integrates the two markets. The proposed cooperation ranges 
from the gradual removal of bilateral customs duties to the convergence of regulatory regimes 
across the Atlantic. The agricultural sectors on both sides will be profoundly affected by a TTIP 
                                                          
10 Jean and Bureau (2016) report that currently effective regional trade agreements have promoted world trade in 
food products by 30% to 40%. Our simulation results suggest that the TTIP agreement would stimulate more trade 
than previous regional trade pacts.  
Page 15 of 21 
 
agreement as policies affecting the agri-food industries diverge substantially between the two 
markets.  
We investigate the impact of a potential TTIP agreement on the cross-Atlantic trade in 
plant products, with emphasis on the elimination of tariffs and the convergence of MRLs that 
regulate pesticide residues. Deploying a state-of-the-art econometric model, we find that the 
elimination of tariffs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by $300 million a year and 
US export of plant products to the EU $940 million a year. Furthermore, the mutual recognition 
of MRLs raises US import of plant products from the EU by $79 million or $130 million a year, 
and US export of plant products to the EU by $635 million or $661 million a year. The 
endorsement of Codex MRLs by the US and the EU has the potential to release even more trade 
opportunities. 
We foresee several extensions to the current research. First, the proposed model can be 
used to evaluate other policies interfering with agricultural trade across the Atlantic. For example, 
one could consider the reconciliation of SPS measures governing food and feed additives and 
antibiotic residues in animal products. Second, the possible trade-diversion effects of a TTIP 
agreement are of great interest to stakeholders and policy makers beyond the US and the EU. In 
particular, it is worth exploring whether the expansion of cross-Atlantic trade is at the expense of 
diminished export opportunities faced by less developed nations. In addition, future research 
could go beyond trade growths and investigate the welfare implications of the TTIP agreement. 
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Appendix A 
Table A. Names of plant products, based on the Harmonized System 
Chapter Description Product names (HS 4 or 6 digits) 
HS-06 live trees & other plants canna,  chufa, dasheen 
HS-07 edible vegetables artichoke, asparagus, bean*, broccoli, Brussels 
sprouts, bulb onion, cabbage, cassava(roots), celery, 
chickpea, chicory(tops),  chrysanthemum, cucumber, 
eggplant, endive, garden beet(roots), garlic, green 
onion, lentil, lettuce(head), lettuce(leaf), mushroom, 
non-bell pepper, olive, pea*, potato, spinach, squash, 
sweet potato, tomato, turnip 
HS-08 edible fruits & nuts,  
peel of citrus/melons 
almond, apple*, apricot , avocado, blueberry, 
beechnut, Brazil nut, cantaloupe,  cashew, cherry, 
chestnut, coconut, date, dry prune plum , fresh prune 
plum,  grape, grapefruit, guava,  hazelnut, kiwifruit, 
kumquat, loquat,  nectarine, orange, papaya, peach, 
pear, pineapple,  pistachios, plantain, raisin, 
strawberry*, tangelo, walnut, watermelon, 
youngberry* 
HS-09 coffee, tea, mate & spices ginger, pepper, summer savory 
HS-10 Cereals barley, corn, corn salad, lupin, millet*, oat, rice, 
sorghum, wheat 
HS-12 oil seeds/ misc. grains/  
med. plants/ straw 
cotton seed, hop(dried cones), mustard spinach, 
peanut, sesame seed, sugar beet (roots) 
Note: Products with * have multiple matches in the HS classifications. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B. List of importing and exporting countries 
Importing countries  Exporting countries 
        
Australia New 
Zealand 
 Algeria Domini-
can Rep. 
Israel Pakistan Thailand 
        
Belgium Portugal  Argentina Ecuador Italy Panama Trinidad/ 
Tobago 
        
Canada Rep. of 
Korea 
 Australia Egypt Jamaica Peru Tunisia 
        
Denmark Spain  Bahamas El 
Salvador 
Japan Philippine Turkey 
        
Finland Sweden  Barbados Finland Jordan Poland United 
Arab 
Emirates 
        
France United 
Kingdoms 
 Belgium France Kenya Portugal United 
Kingdoms 
        
Germany United 
States 
 Brazil Germany Lebanon Rep. of 
Korea 
United 
States 
        
Greece   Canada Greece Malaysia Russia 
Federation 
Venezuela 
 
        
Ireland   Chile Guatemala Mexico Singapore Vietnam 
        
Israel   China Honduras Morocco South 
Africa 
 
        
Italy   Columbia Hong 
Kong 
Nether-
lands 
Spain  
        
Japan   Costa 
Rica 
Indonesia New 
Zealand 
Sri Lanka  
        
Nether-
lands 
  Denmark Ireland Nicaragua Sweden  
Note: Importing countries are selected OECD members with nominal per-capita GDP over 
$20,000 as of 2012. Source: International Monetary Fund. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C. Estimated coefficients of high-income OECD’ imports of plant products 
Variables Outcome equation Selection equation 
 Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err 
       
MRL: Demand 
enhancement 
 0.232**  0.105  0.039  0.030 
     ⊗ EU as importer  0.466***  0.113  0.101***  0.032 
     ⊗ EU as exporter  0.138  0.129 -0.014  0.035 
     ⊗ US as importer  1.312***  0.176  0.489***  0.049 
     ⊗ US as exporter -0.318  0.121 -0.159**  0.064 
     
MRL: Trade cost  0.950***  0.128  0.271***  0.036 
     ⊗ EU as importer -1.296***  0.134 -0.259***  0.038 
     ⊗ EU as exporter -0.674***  0.159 -0.135***  0.044 
     ⊗ US as importer -1.549***  0.254 -0.545***  0.072 
     ⊗ US as exporter -0.324  0.217 -0.087  0.065 
     
ln(1+tariff) -0.926***  0.138 -0.263***  0.038 
     ⊗ EU as importer -1.562***  0.234 -0.627***  0.063 
     ⊗ EU as exporter -0.370  0.263  0.161**  0.063 
     ⊗ US as importer -6.549***  1.094 -2.074***  0.265 
     ⊗ US as exporter  0.080  0.342  0.149  0.108 
     
ln(Production)  1.209***  0.016  0.229***  0.001 
ln(Distance) -2.262***  0.051 -0.617***  0.008 
Border  0.488***  0.110 -0.251***  0.033 
Colony  0.612***  0.057  0.129***  0.016 
Language  0.984***  0.049  0.302***  0.012 
Inverse Mills Ratio  3.608***  0.100  --  -- 
Number of obs. 58,603 315,397 
Note: The notation ⊗ represents the interaction with the following indicator variable. The year-specific 
importers’ fixed effects and the year-specific and chapter-specific exporters’ fixed effects are included 
in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. Chapter-specific common religion variables 
are used as the excluded variables in the Heckman two-step procedure. Notations **, and *** denote 
significance levels at 5% and 1% respectively. 
